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bDepartment of Sociology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Far-right groups increasingly use social media to interact with other groups and
reach their followers. Social media also enable ‘ordinary’ people to participate in
online discussions and shape political discourse. This study compares the
networks and discourses of Facebook pages of Western European far-right
parties, movements and communities. Network analyses of pages indicate
that the form of far-right mobilization is shaped by political opportunities. The
absence of a strong far-right party offline seems to be reflected in an online
network in which non-institutionalized groups are the most prominent actors,
rather than political parties. In its turn, the discourse is shaped by the type of
actor. Content analyses of comments of followers show that parties address
the political establishment more often than immigration and Islam, compared
to non-institutionalized groups. Furthermore, parties apply less extreme
discursive practices towards ‘the other’ than non-institutionalized groups.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 14 September 2017; Accepted 31 January 2018
KEYWORDS Far-right; social media; social networks; discourse analysis; online participation
The Internet offers a powerful tool for far-right groups for reaching fol-
lowers, connecting with like-minded groups, and spreading their ideology
(Caiani and Parenti 2013; Zhou et al. 2005). Social media also enables
‘ordinary’ citizens to actively participate in online discussions and
express their opinions (Zuckerman 2015).
The issues that far-right groups and their followers are concerned about
– such as Islamisation, European integration and immigration – are hotly
debated in almost all Western European countries. They use different
channels to exert influence – ranging from institutionalized politics to
street marches. Right-wing groups differ in their organization (Minken-
berg 2003), the issues they emphasize and whether they take a moderate
or hard line (Akkerman et al. 2016).
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Research on the far-right has focused on the electoral channel – political
parties – and certain segments of the discourse – traditional mass media and
party programs (for recent reviews, see Golder 2016; Mudde 2016; Muis and
Immerzeel 2017). Far-right groups and their supporters often make use of
social media, but research into this topic is still scarce (Ernst et al. 2017).
This study addresses these two lacunas in the literature. It poses two inter-
related questions: first, what is the relationship between political opportunities
and type of online mobilization (parties vs non-institutionalized groups)?
Second, what are the differences in the online discourse between parties and
non-institutionalized groups? To answer these questions, we analysed data
fromFacebook pages of British, German, French andDutch far-right groups.
Our results show that far-right mobilization manifests itself in different
organizational forms depending on the political opportunities for the far-
right. Closed political opportunities can explain why social movements are
more prominent online than political parties in some countries. These
findings are in line with Mudde’s (2016) observation that since 2015, we
have seen a strong presence of non-party organizations offline in Germany
and Britain, most notably Pegida and English Defence League (EDL).
Furthermore, our comparison of comments of online followers on a
selection of far-right pages reveals that the discourse is shaped by the
type of actor. Parties focus more strongly on anti-establishment populism,
whereas non-institutionalized groups tend to address issues of immigra-
tion and Islam more strongly. Concerning the radicalness of rejecting
non-natives, our findings indicate that the debate is generally more
extreme on pages of non-institutionalized groups.
Theoretical background
The core feature of far-right groups is exclusionary, ethno-nationalist
xenophobia (Rydgren 2005). Far-right discourse is nativist, which refers
to a combination of nationalism and xenophobia: emphasizing one’s
own culture, traditions and nationality, and negatively portraying cultu-
rally deviant outgroups (Mudde 2007). Far-right groups can be extreme
or radical. Extremist groups are anti-democratic, they go beyond the
limits of the democratic political processes. Radical groups only question
some of the constitutional foundations of liberal democracies (Golder
2016; Mudde 2007). Hence, the radical right is democratic, in that it
accepts popular sovereignty and majority rule (Mudde 2016). Far-right
actors are not necessarily anti-establishment or populist. Nevertheless,
the combination is very likely (Greven 2016).
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Far-right mobilization takes different organizational forms (Caiani
et al. 2012; Hutter 2014; Minkenberg 2003). Parties have increasingly
become movement-like, networked organizations (Chadwick &
Stromer-Galley 2016; Della Porta et al. 2017). On social media, ‘political
communication of social movements, parties and ordinary citizens is
meshed together much more fluidly than in a mass media setting with tra-
ditional gatekeepers’ (Chadwick 2013, as cited by Stier et al. 2017: 1368).
Content is often posted by followers (in the form of comments) instead of
by groups (in the form of posts). Followers are likely to post similar
content on different pages. Stier et al. (2017: 1381), for example, show
that the same users are active on the pages of the party AfD and the move-
ment Pegida. However, as comments are reactions to what is posted by
page owners, discourse between pages varies. As Atton (2006) showed
of the webforum of the British National Party, moderators might steer
conversations or remove comments.
As we will explain, the type of actor is relevant for understanding differ-
ences in discursive positioning against non-natives and political elites. We
distinguish parties (institutionalized) from non-institutionalized groups,
which range frommore organized social movements to looser online com-
munities. In contrast to parties, movements do not take part in elections.
They do have members and organize meetings or protests. Online com-
munities are social aggregations with similar values and interests that
only exist online (Shen et al. 2006). The differences between non-institu-
tionalized groups are sometimes fuzzy. Caren et al. (2012: 167) identify a
form of activism that bridges movements and online communities: the
social movement online community (SMOC). They define SMOC as ‘a
sustained network of individuals who work to maintain an overlapping
set of goals and identities tied to a social movement linked through
quasi-public online discussions’.
Political opportunities and far-right networks
To explain variation in far-right mobilization, it is not the grievances per
se that matter – we assume that discontent about immigration is similar
across Western Europe. Rather, it is whether far-right groups can act effec-
tively on existing grievances within the opportunities offered by the politi-
cal-institutional setting (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005; Muis 2015; Kincaid
2017).
The political opportunity structure (POS) is typically defined by the
openness of the political system, the stability of elite alignments, the
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presence of allies among the elite and state repression (McAdam et al.
1996). Scholars applying the concept specifically to far-right parties
have pointed at the electoral system and at ‘political space’ left open by
political competitors (Koopmans et al. 2005; Muis and Immerzeel 2017).
Strong far-right parties are more likely in an open political context. In
closed contexts, far-right groups have to find alternative ways to mobilize
and express their grievances, resulting in more non-parliamentary action
groups (Hutter 2014). In addition to joining social movement organizations,
people can establish or join online communities when they feel that the pol-
itical arena neglects their concerns (Awan 2016). The political opportunity
model assumes that actors make a rational choice among alternatives. For
instance, street violence is a relatively costly strategy, which is mitigated
where less costly alternatives are available (Koopmans 1996). The electoral
channel seems to effectively substitute for street activity and violence (Min-
kenberg 2003; but see Jäckle and König 2017). Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 1: open political opportunities for far-right groups will result in a
strong far-right party and an online network that consist mainly of institutio-
nalized actors; closed political opportunities lead to a network consisting
mainly of non-institutional actors.
Furthermore, we expect that open political opportunities will yield a
more concentrated network, structured around a prominent institutiona-
lized actor. Most non-parliamentary groups will establish links with this
actor since they ‘treat parties as their champions in the electoral arena’
(Arzheimer 2015: 8). More extreme movements strategically link to pro-
minent right-wing parties, as these might serve the ‘hard-core groups in
their recruitment efforts’ (Burris et al. 2000: 323). In contrast, closed pol-
itical opportunities result in a segmented network, with several prominent
non-institutionalized actors. Consequently, we predict that:
Hypothesis 2: open political opportunities will yield a more concentrated
network, structured around a prominent institutionalized actor, whereas
closed political opportunities result in a segmented network, structured
around several non-institutionalized actors.
Type of group and far-right discourse
Far-right groups differ in the issues they emphasize and the extremity of their
frames. Cultural ‘outgroups’ (nativism) and political elites (populism) can be
frequently discussed or not, depending on the type of group. Movements
tend to articulate issues that are left unaddressed by institutional actors,
and vice versa (Hutter 2014: 26). Moreover, non-institutionalized groups
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tend to be more ideologically outspoken and single-issue focused than its
party variants (Minkenberg 2003). Parties need to address a broader spec-
trum of issues than socialmovements to attract broader support (Przeworski
and Sprague 1986). Additionally, far-right parties often downplay controver-
sial issues. Constraints imposed by cultural norms are more relevant for
groups that mobilize via the parliamentary channel (Minkenberg 2003).
Therefore, we expect far-right parties to focus more on anti-establishment
populism, rather than on the exclusion of non-natives (Jagers andWalgrave
2007; Stier et al. 2017). Hence:
Hypothesis 3a: Nativism is less salient in the online discourse of parties than in
the discourse of non-institutionalized groups.
Hypothesis 3b: Anti-elitist populism is more salient in the online discourse of
parties than in the discourse of non-institutionalized groups.
Far-right groups furthermore differ in their extremity of discourse
(Maan et al. 2017). As we pointed out, parties aim to appeal to a
broader support base. The expectation is that parties adopt a more mod-
erate discourse, specifically on nativism, than non-party actors (Golder
2016; Rydgren 2005). Ideological extremism tends to decline when
groups become more entrenched in the electoral channel (Minkenberg
2003; Piven and Cloward 1979). Groups without formal membership or
structures tend to adopt more extreme positions (Goodwin et al. 2012:
6) and more activist forms of mobilization online (Caiani and Parenti
2013: 107). Consequently, far-right parties often distance themselves
from movements. In Austria, for instance, the FPÖ considers integration
and assimilation possible, while this is unacceptable for the Identitarian
Movement (Maan et al. 2017). We expect thus:
Hypothesis 4: The online discourse on nativism is more extreme on the pages of
non-institutionalized groups than on pages of institutionalized groups.
Methods
The countries included in this study – The United Kingdom, Germany,
France and The Netherlands – vary in party systems and standing of
far-right parties (cf. Engesser et al. 2017).
Table 1 illustrates the electoral successes of far-right parties in each
country when we collected our data.
According to Kitschelt (2007: 1191) ‘the institutional configurations
most unfavourable to the rise of radical right-wing parties exist in
Britain’. The First Past the Post electoral system limits possibilities to
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achieve electoral success. Far-right parties have historically been isolated
by hostility from mainstream parties and have failed to gain and consoli-
date many parliamentary seats (Ford and Goodwin 2014).
In Germany, a threshold hampers niche parties in gaining electoral
success. Moreover, mainstream parties refuse to form coalitions with
far-right parties (Backes and Mudde 2000). At the time that we collected
our data, parties, such as the NPD, Die Republikaner and the AfD, were
relatively marginal (Arzheimer 2015). In the 2013 General Election, the
AfD did not pass the electoral threshold.
The French two-round majoritarian electoral system is more forgiving
to niche parties than the British electoral system, but still hinders the elec-
toral success of the far-right on the national level. Potential allies have
always rejected any electoral agreement with the far-right (Caiani and
Parenti 2013). The Dutch electoral system of proportional representation
with a low threshold offers parties such as the PVV the most favourable
opportunities to gain electoral success (Akkerman et al. 2016; Muis
2015). We thus conclude that during the time of our research, political
opportunities for the far-right were closed in the UK, open in the Nether-
lands, and intermediate in France and Germany.
Data were retrieved from Facebook using Netvizz (Rieder 2013). We
mapped the online networks using a snowball technique (cf. Caiani and
Parenti 2013). We first gathered the direct links for the following initial
sample of Facebook pages: BNP; UKIP; Britain First; Infidels of Britain;
I am proud to be British (United Kingdom); Alternative für Deutschland;
Identitaire Bewegung; Pegida; Wir sind das Volk (Germany); Génération
Identitaire; Bloc Identitaire; Patriotes de France; Front National
(France); Nederland mijn Vaderland, Wij zijn Tegen het nieuwe regeerak-
koord; PVV aanhangers; PVV; Identitair verzet (the Netherlands). The




national elections Popular vote
Parliamentary
seats
France Front National (National Front) 41,070 13.4% (3.7%) 2 (of 577)
Germany Die Republikaner 41,539 0.2% ─
NPD 1.3% ─
Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD) 4.7% ─
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) 41,164 10.1% 24 (of 150)
UK British National Party (BNP) 40,304 1.9% ─
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 3.1% ─
Source: Immerzeel (2015).
Notes: Figure for France is based on the vote in the first round (second round between brackets). Figures
for Germany are based on the Party list ballot.
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selection was based on earlier research and by searching for pages within
Facebook using keywords. Subsequently, the links of pages that were dis-
covered though the crawling of this sample were also gathered to generate
a bigger network and identify less well-known groups.
The networks contained several pages that might fit the far-right ideol-
ogy in specific contexts, such as homophobic pages in the French network,
and animal rights and anti-paedophilia pages in the British network. We
excluded these pages, irrelevant pages (such as those of brands) and pages
from different countries, as to allow a better comparison between the net-
works in the different contexts.
Network analyses were performed using Gephi (Bastian et al. 2009). To
identify influential groups in the network (H1), we calculated the number
of likes that a Facebook page receives from other pages in the network –
the in-degree (Caiani and Parenti 2013).
A cluster analysis was performed to map the clusters making up the far-
right network and reveal the segmentation of the network (H2) (Zhou
et al. 2005; Caiani and Parenti 2013). As our hypotheses indicate, we
are mainly interested in which type of actor (institutionalized versus
non-institutionalized) dominates the online network. To further sub-
stantiate our network analysis, we also provide the main topics these
groups focus on. Using the picture, banner and info-section on the Face-
book pages, groups were categorized as focusing on immigration, Islam,
nationalism, national- or European anti-establishment populism, or on
supporting a far-right party or politician. Pages addressing multiple
issues were categorized as general. The page Ban the Burka in UK was,
for example, categorized as a page about Islam. A random selection of
55 pages was hand-coded by both authors to assess the intercoder
reliability (Krippendorf’s alpha: 0.96).
For the discourse analyses, five pages – at least one party and a variety of
non-institutionalized actors – from each country were selected. For each
actor-type, we selected the most popular pages, based on likes of users.
One prominent page – the English Defence League – could unfortunately
not be included in the selection for technical reasons.1 For all pages,
except for the extremely active Pegida and Nederland mijn Vaderland,
data covering a year (March 2014–March 2015) were gathered (Table 2).
Because of this long timespan, we expect that specific events do not signifi-
cantly influence the findings.Most pages included in this analysis have now
1This page was reinstalled making earlier posts inaccessible. Instead, the page of the closely related Infidels
of Britain was included.
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either been permanently removed, or have been reinstalled, thus making
earlier posts inaccessible.
We analysed comments instead of posts, as posts often solely consist of
images, links or videos. Furthermore, comments are posted by ‘ordinary
people’ and reflect more diverse opinions than posts. Automated text ana-
lyses were done using Python’s Natural Language Toolkit (cf. Bird et al.
2009).2 Comments were pre-processed by removing punctualization,
uppercases and stopwords.
To analyse the salience of topics (H3), frequency analyses were per-
formed. We used thematic word clusters in English, French, German
and Dutch around the issues of nativism (immigration, Islam) and anti-
elitist populism (the national and European political elite). Clusters con-
tained synonyms and misspellings, such as ‘immigrants’, ‘foreigners’ and
‘foreners’ for the immigration cluster.3 We selected words for the clusters
after manually reading a random selection of 100 comments from which
words related to these issues were identified.
To analyse the extremeness of claims by far-right groups (H4), the most
often occurring words in comments containing cultural ‘outgroups’ and
political elites were analysed. In addition, we carried out qualitative analy-
sis, consisting of the authors reading 50 comments from each page.
Results
Description of the online networks
We first describe the networks in the four countries. Subsequently, the
prominence of actors in each network is linked to the POS in which
these operate. The French and German online networks are much
bigger (810 and 476 pages) than the Dutch and British networks (69
and 225 pages). This is important to note, since the network size influ-
ences the maximum in-degrees.
The British network (Figure 1) is centralized around the EDL, which
has the highest standing (in-degree = 64). The party UKIP has a relatively
low in-degree (in-degree = 31). The British network is rather homo-
geneous: three out of four clusters (purple, red and green) consist of
anti-Islam movements (see Table 3). The EDL-cluster encompasses 37%
of all pages. The fourth cluster (light blue), representing pages related to
UKIP (e.g. youth divisions, politicians), is relatively far removed from
2See supplemental online material for additional information.
3See supplemental online material for the word clusters.
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these movements. UKIP indeed distanced themselves from the more
openly xenophobic stances of radical counterparts, such as the BNP
(Ford and Goodwin 2014).
TheGerman network (Figure 2) is highly fragmented, containing several
small and demarcated clusters. The blue cluster at the lower right part of the
network contains the party Alternative für Deutschland, the small pink
Table 2. The pages selected for the discourse analysis.
Type Likes on 22 March 2015 Comments
British
I am proud to be British Community 234,835 713,78
Infidels of Britain Movement 52,602 110,549
Britain First Movement 692,127 614,72
British National Party Party 178,351 105,629
UKIP Party 342,126 450,703
German
Ich bin Patriot aber kein Nazi Community 55,232 55,236
Wir alle sind deutsch Community 19,206 26,420
Identitäre Bewegung – Deutschland Movement 13,203 5632
Pegida Movement 159,594 197,103
Alternative für Deutschland Party 138,902 68,369
French
Patriotes de France Community 79,839 48,904
La Vraie France Community 42,743 53,522
Bloc Identitaire Movement 39,423 19,628
Génération Identitaire Movement 61,809 22,294
Front National Party 220,289 64,794
Dutch
PVV aanhangers Community 24,546 77,617
PVV (unofficial) Community 11,198 12,101
Het volk is het zat Community 16,578 7737
Nederland mijn Vaderland Community 137,123 4374
Identitair Verzet Movement 6181 11,275
Figure 1. British network (relation = if a page likes another page, directed).
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cluster consists of pages related to the party PRO NRW, and the dark blue
cluster in the middle of the network relates toDie Rechte. Interestingly, the
three biggest clusters consist of anti-Islam and anti-immigrant pages of
movements and online communities. The latter type of groupmainlymani-
fests itself in the form of local anti-asylum seekers pages, such as ‘No to
Asylum Shelter in [town name]’, which make up about 26% of the
network (the orange cluster). These online communities resemble groups
that emerged after sexual assault reports during New Year’s Eve 2015 in
Cologne. On Facebook alone, more than 100 anti-immigrant ‘security
watch groups’ were active (Saal 2016). The green–yellow cluster at the
top of the network consists of pages that belong to the anti-Islammovement
Identitäre Bewegung. The seagreen cluster in themiddle of the network con-
tains pages related to Pegida. While Pegida is themost prominent actor (in-
degree = 92), the German network does not clearly revolve around it.
In France, pages related to the Front National (FN), such as pages of poli-
ticians and youth divisions – in the light-green cluster at the bottom of the
network –make up about one-fifth of the network (Figure 3). The network
revolves around the FN, withmost prominently, the pages ofMarine Le Pen
(in-degree = 168), Front National andMarion Maréchal-Le Pen. The main
Table 3. Overview of the type, content and proportion of pages belonging to the clusters
in the networks.
Country Cluster (figure1–4) Dominant type Dominant content Proportion
British Red Movement Islam 0.37
Purple Community Islam 0.22
Green Community Nationalism 0.20
Blue Institutionalized UKIP (party) 0.21
German Orange Community Immigration 0.26
Green (middle) Community and
Movement
Islam 0.23
Green (top) Movement Islam 0.15
Blue (bottom) Party Alternative für Deutschland
(party)
0.14
Green Community Nationalism 0.13
Pink Party PRO NRW (party) 0.05
Blue (scattered) Party Die Rechte (party) 0.03
French Pink Community Nationalism, Islam,
immigration
0.35
Green (bottom) Institutionalized Front National (party) 0.20
Yellow Community Anti-establishment 0.18
Blue Community Anti-establishment 0.13
Green (top) Movement Islam 0.11
Dutch Blue Community/Movement Islam, Nationalist, immigrant 0.28
Green Communities Immigrant 0.12
Pink/purple Communities Anti-establishment 0.22
Purple/blue Communities Party support 0.10
Red Communities Nationalist, anti-establishment 0.25
Note: The percentages do not lead up to 100, since some pages do not belong to any cluster.
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groups in other clusters have a substantially lower standing. The green
cluster at the top of the network contains anti-IslammovementsGéneration
Identitaire and Bloc Identitaire (11%). Finally, the pink cluster (35%) con-
sists of a variety of nationalistic community pages, aswell as anti-immigrant
and anti-Islam pages. Two other clusters in this network (in total 31%)
contain anti-political elite pages.
The Dutch network (Figure 4) is relatively small and consists mainly of
online communities. The most prominent actor is the movement Identi-
tair Verzet (in-degree = 12). It is located in the largest, blue cluster
(28%). The red cluster contains several nationalistic, anti-immigrant
and anti-Islam pages. Similarly, online communities in the green cluster
mobilize against asylum shelters in the Netherlands. The pink–purple
cluster consists of anti-political establishment groups. Pages supporting
the party PVV or Geert Wilders (e.g. I do NOT file a complaint against
Wilders) make up the purple/blue cluster. The Dutch network does not
contain any official party pages. Neither the PVV nor Wilders had an
official Facebook page. This can be explained by the fact that Wilders
Figure 2. German network (relation = if a page likes another page, directed).
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keeps tight control over all party communication. The PVV is a party
without any members and Wilders relies almost exclusively on Twitter.
Political opportunities and nature of networks
Weexpected that a closed political structure, such as in Britain, would result in
non-parliamentary groups beingmore prominent in the online network (H1).
Figure 3. French network (relation = if a page likes another page, directed).
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The streetmovement EDL indeed represents themost ‘visible’ online actor for
expressing far-right views.We expected parliamentary groups to bemore pro-
minent in online networks in open political contexts, such as the Netherlands.
The Dutch network, however, consists mainly of online communities and
action groups. Nevertheless, several Dutch groups clearly revolve around
support for Geert Wilders – the attitudes and identities of followers are tied
to this far-right party.Analogous toCaren et al. (2012),we could conceptualize
this form of online activism as ‘a political party online community’. Germany
and France have an intermediate POS. In both countries, the online networks
have a combination of both parties and movements.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that open political structures yield dense
networks, structured around prominent far-right parties (H2). The Dutch
network, however, lacks a dominant institutional actor around which it
revolves. The French network is centralized around FN. We expected
more segmented networks in closed political contexts, in which a domi-
nant far-right party is less likely. This is confirmed in the German
context, which consists of many demarcated clusters, with few intra-
group links between parties and movements. However, the British
network is rather dense and structured around the movement EDL.
Description of the online discourse of far-right groups
After describing the discourse of far-right groups in each country, we draw
a conclusion on whether similarities and variations are related to the type
Figure 4. Dutch network (relation = if a page likes another page, directed).
552 O. KLEIN AND J. MUIS
of group. Table 4 presents the number of times words related to the
national political elite, Europe, Islam and immigration are mentioned
per 10,000 words. Tables 5–8 show word co-occurrences of these
‘targets’ of the far-right for a selection of pages. Combined with our quali-
tative analysis, they show how strongly non-natives and the political estab-
lishments are rejected by online followers of the far-right.
On pages of the movements Infidels of Britain and Britain First, the
Islam is clearly the most salient issue. In contrast, the comments on the
UKIP page suggest that its followers focus more on the political elite.
The national elite and Europe are discussed 120 and 131 times per
Table 4. Frequency of words for each 10,000 words on the Facebook pages.
Elite Europe Islam Immigration
British pages
Proud to be British 62 16 51 35
Infidels of Britain 120 52 130 59
Britain First 92 15 238 26
British National Party 76 21 163 47
UKIP 120 131 24 68
German pages
Ich bin Patriot aber kein Nazi 35 17 58 30
Wir alle sind Deutsch 77 21 46 35
Identitaire Bewegung 16 29 64 21
Pegida 39 19 94 33
Alternative für Deutschland 47 65 14 14
French pages
Patriotes de France 25 17 28 30
La vraie France 14 13 25 34
Bloc Identitaire 25 24 49 33
Generation Identitaire 17 18 26 15
Front National 61 31 25 25
Dutch pages
PVV Aanhangers 80 31 76 27
PVV 146 42 45 24
Het Volk is het zat 131 74 31 20
Nederland mijn Vaderland 139 23 23 10
Identitair Verzet 96 41 138 20
Table 5. Collocates of non-natives and political elites on the British page Infidels of
Britain.
Europe Elite Immigrants Islam
Fuck Fuck Country Country
Country Country Illegal British
Land Fucking People People
Countries British Benefits Fuck
Immigration Mr Stop Countries
Ukip Ukip British Fucking
Vote Vote Fuck Terrorists
Leave Back Britain Extremists
British People English Scum
Rights Stop Labour Stop
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10,000 words, respectively (Table 4). Islam (24) and immigration (68) are
mentioned less often. The issue of populism is also remarkably salient on
the community page Proud to be British.
In contrast with our expectation, our results suggest that the British
National Party deem nativism, rather than anti-elitism more important.
Even though the party has adopted a more moderate discourse over
time, it maintained its core ideology of racial prejudice (Edwards 2012).
The discourse seems to be more extreme on the pages of Infidels of
Britain and Britain First than on the other pages. This is visible in the
kind of words that are most often used in relation to Islam and immigrants
(Table 5), such as terrorists, fuck and scum. Allah is referred to as ‘evil and
Satan in disguise’. References are made to bomb, detaining and deporting
Muslims. Islam itself is referred to as cult, curse and plague. For example:4
they breed like rats cos contraception is unislamic, they go to the government
with outstretched arms begging for money. [sic]
The discourse of UKIP and BNP differs from other British pages, as com-
ments contain more civilized language. On the page of UKIP, the framing
of immigrants and Muslims is more in terms of socio-economic issues and
failure of government. The debate on these pages is more moderate
because a number of commenters criticize Islamophobes and distinguish
between moderate Islam and extremists.
Comments on the German pages of the movements Pegida and Iden-
titäre Bewegung both mention issues related to Islam most often, respect-
ively, 94 and 64 times per 10,000 words. Alternatively, the comments on
the AfD page mainly address the European (65) and national political elite
(47). Islam (1) and immigrants (14) are mentioned less often. Interest-
ingly, both populism and nativism are salient on the community pages
Ich bin Patriot aber kein Nazi and Wir sind alle Deutsch.
In line with the focus of German citizenship on ‘origin’ (Koopmans
et al. 2005), Islam and immigration are frequently discussed in relation
to incompatibility with German nationality and Christian traditions
(Table 6). One follower of Alternative für Deutschland for example
argues: ‘we are part of the Christian tradition (…) Do you want to
betray our past to open the gates to Islam?!’
Nativism is clearly most extreme in the discussions on the pages Pegida
and Identitaire Bewegung. Users express a ‘fear of Islamisation of
Germany’. Some comments are even calling for killing ‘all followers of
4See online supplemental material for more examples.
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Islam’ and accuse the government of genocide of their ‘own people’. Para-
doxically, this follower of Pegida criticizes the ‘dangerous ideology’ of
Islam by associating it with Nazism:
Islam must be treated in the same way as the ideology and the glorification the
Third Reich. There are dangerous similarities. Aggression, racism, call to kill,
intolerance, oppression
In France, non-institutionalized actors seem more focused on nativist
issues than on the political establishment. The community pages Patriotes
de France and La Vraie France focus somewhat more on immigration than
on Islam, and the movements Bloc Identitaire and Generation Identitaire
discuss Islam most often. The comments on the page of FN are more
populist in nature, addressing mainly the national political elite (61)
and the European elite (31).
Interestingly, we hardly notice any differences between pages in terms
of the extremeness of discourse. The French online far-right debate about
Islam emphasizes ‘adaptability’ to French culture and stresses that public
manifestations of religion should not be allowed. Moreover, Islam is fre-
quently referred to as a cancer, fascism, and Muslims are sometimes
Table 6. Collocates of non-natives and political elites on the German page Ich bin ein
Patriot aber kein Nazi.
Europe Elite Immigrants Islam
Deutschland Frau Man Deutschland
Man Deutschland Gegen Gehort
Islam Angela Mehr Gegen
Krieg Man Deutschland Religion
Gehort Wahlen Deutsche Man
Menschen Weg Land Christentum
Usa Macht Gut Deutsche
Welt Volk Weg Land
Continent Politiek Jahre Menschen
Deutschen Gewahlt Polen Europa
Table 7. Collocates of non-natives and political elites on the French page Génération
Identitaire.
Europe Elite Immigrants Islam
France France France France
Bravo Ordre Pays Pays
Francais Merde Francais Religion
Pays Racialle Enfants Francais
From Marine Parents Vivre
Contre Proteste Algerie Interdit
Jeunesse Honte Racaille Monde
Jeunes Serinent Clandestins Europe
Invasion Amalgame Bravo Anti
Islam Socialiste Absolument Contre
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referred to as paedophiles. The political elite is blamed for letting in immi-
grants and the Islam in. Some express the fear of a future war against Islam
in Europe. Community pages are often less extreme in their frames.
Lastly, ifwe turn our attention toDutch far-right pages, it is remarkable that
anti-elitist criticism is the most salient topic on almost all of them. On the
unofficial PVV page, for instance, the political elite is mentioned 146 times
per 10,000 words, which is more often than immigrants (24) and Islam (45).
The movement Identitair Verzet slightly differs from this observation. The
comments mention Islam much more often than on the other pages (138).
The Dutch discourse on immigration is mostly related to socio-econ-
omic topics, criminality and healthcare. Moreover, critique on the Islam
is generally discussed by emphasizing the lack of adaptation to Dutch
norms and values. In this respect, the anti-Islam movement Identitair
Verzet again differs from the other pages because the discourse on the
Islam is rather extreme, for example:
the Islam mentality is full of disrespect, agression, violence, pedophelia, murder
and torture out of the name of a sadistic fairytale figure
Remarkable for the Dutch case is the high frequency of counterspeech: com-
ments on tolerance towards Muslims. For instance, on the page PVV Sup-
porters, party leader Wilders is criticized for his extreme views on Muslims:
[Wilders] forgets that he is talking about people (…) the Netherlands is a multi-
cultural society, and I am proud of that. I also disagree with certain parts of the
Quran or Islamic culture. But this does not mean that ‘they’ force me to believe
in what they believe in.
Comparing the online discourse of far-right groups
As expected (H3), nativism is less salient in the online discourse of far-
right parties than of non-institutionalized groups. Followers of UKIP,
Table 8. Collocates of non-natives and political elites on the Dutch page PVV Aanhangers.
European National Immigrants Islam
Weg Weg Nederlanders Nederland
Geld Wilders Genoeg Land
Nederland Mark Jaar Mensen
Betalen Kabinet Nederland Haat
Miljoen Mensen Komen Goede
Rutte Volk Land Joden
Konten Nederlands Net Terug
Likkers Stemmen Volk Moeten
Genoeg Pvv Islam Onderdrukking
Bende Woorden Vol Vele
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FN and AfD generally mention the political elite relatively often compared
to movements and communities and focus less on Islam and immigrants.
The Dutch case differs from this picture, since discontent on Dutch far-
right online communities also strongly revolves around anti-elitism. The
open political opportunities for the far-right in the Netherlands could
perhaps explain this. Wilders has considerable electoral support. Conse-
quently, his anti-Islam stance figures prominently in the traditional
media and political debate. At the same time, however, all established
parties ignore or criticize the PVV.
Parties and non-institutionalized groups also differ in the extremeness
of the discursive practices of their followers. As expected, we find that
British and German movements employ indeed a more extreme nativist
discourse than parties (H4). In France, however, differences in extreme-
ness between the different types of groups are not as evident. FN and
the Identitarian Movements seem to hardly differ from each other in
this respect, whereas French community pages are often less extreme in
their frames than both FN and movement pages.
Conclusion and discussion
This article investigated the networks and discourses of far-right Facebook
pages in Western Europe. Our findings show that limited political oppor-
tunities for far-right parties yield more online engagement in protest poli-
tics in Britain, and that intermediate political opportunities in Germany
and France result in online networks with both parties and movements.
The open POS is not reflected in the Dutch online far-right network,
which consists mainly of online communities.
The clustering within the far-right networks reflects the offline realm to
some extent: Germany has a fragmented network composed of small separ-
ated clusters, including different far-right parties that have some success at
the regional level; the French online network is relatively cohesive and cen-
tralized around a party. Overall, however, the structure of the networks
cannot be clearly linked to offline political opportunities for the far-right.
Most notably, in contrast with what we expected, the closed British political
context has a dense, centralized online network structured around a promi-
nentmovement (EDL). Allen (2011: 286) notes that its exceptional, inclusive
strategy led to a broad, ‘multicultural’ coalition: ‘unlike other far-right organ-
izations, the EDL is proud to recognize and proclaim its diversity’.
Secondly, our research analysed the discursive practices of supporters of
far-right groups.Ourfindings show that the comments on pages of far-right
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groups clearly differ between types of actors. Online followers of parties
discuss the national and European political elite more often and focus
less on immigration and Islam than social movements and communities.
Furthermore, discourse on party-related pages is generally less extreme
than on pages of movements. Thus, the distinction between institutiona-
lized and non-institutionalized groups is relevant. Additionally, our study
highlights that there are different types of non-institutionalized groups.
Except for the French case, community pages were generally more anti-
elitist compared to social movement pages. Moreover, community pages
were often less extreme in their discursive practices than movements.
Sometimes the division between parties, movements and communities
cannot be easily made. Different types of groups sometimes overlap: for
instance, some community pages focused on supporting a specific party
or leader (e.g. PVV supporters) and some groups are so-called ‘party-
movements’ (e.g. Britain First). Further research could focus more on
the overlap and differences between types of online far-right groups.
Our comparison of far-right online groups across four European
countries serves as a robustness check to determine whether our findings
hold in different contexts. No claims are made about how well the four
countries represent all Western democracies, but given their variation in
terms of far-right mobilization and political-institutional context, the
findings could perhaps be generalizable beyond the four countries at hand.
All studies have shortcomings and our study is no exception. Both quan-
titative and qualitative content analyses have their limitations. First,
although automated text analyses are very reliable, frequent co-occurring
words do not provide a deeper understanding of discursive practices. For
instance, sarcasm is difficult to detect. Therefore, we also conducted a quali-
tative analysis and manually read comments. The downside of this method
is that we did not manually code comments. Further research could incor-
porate qualitative and automated analyses more systematically.
Far-right online mobilization might differ between platforms, depend-
ing on legal regulations about the harmful speech. Further research could
extend cross-group and cross-national comparisons to other platforms.
Due to privacy restrictions, we only selected public pages and ignored
closed Facebook groups (Cleland et al. 2017). Moreover, like private dis-
cussions at home, closed groups cannot be considered as belonging to the
‘public’ discourse we studied in this paper.
Finally, our sample of followers of far-right groups might not represent
the views of all far-right supporters, or of offline membership. This is not
necessarily a weakness. The opinions and statements of far-right Facebook
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members are interesting themselves. Nowadays, people increasingly
acquire their opinions via social media. The online world is not a separate
world, but part of the real world, influencing offline interactions and
decisions (Awan 2016; Golder and Macy 2014). Online political involve-
ment of far-right supporters generally extends offline, where they ‘are far
more likely to get involved in political activism compared with the general
public’ (Bartlett et al. 2011: 22). Facebook, thus, ‘acts as a bridge to offline
activism rather than a replacement’ (2011: 40). Studying far-right groups
online is, therefore, an important and valuable addition to studying them
offline.
Notes on contributors
Ofra Klein is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute. She previously
studied Social Sciences and Digital Humanities. Ofra worked as a research assistant at
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society
at Harvard University. Her research interests are in the field of right-wing populism.
Jasper Muis is an assistant professor at the Sociology Department of the Vrije Univer-
siteit Amsterdam. His research interests include right-wing populism and protest
behaviour. His dissertation (2012) about the rise of right-wing populist Pim
Fortuyn in the Netherlands received the prestigious Dutch Research Prize of the Prae-
mium Erasmianum Foundation.
Disclosure statement




Akkerman, T., De Lange, S.L. and Rooduijn, M. (2016) Radical Right-wing Populist
Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?, London: Routledge.
Allen, C. (2011) ‘Opposing islamification or promoting islamophobia? Understanding
the English defence League’, Patterns of Prejudice 45(4): 279–94.
Arzheimer, K. (2015) ‘The AfD’s Facebook wall: a new hub for far-right mobilisation
in Germany?’, paper presented at APSA annual meeting, San Francisco, USA,
September 3–6.
Atton, C. (2006) ‘Far-right media on the internet: culture, discourse and power’, New
Media & Society 8(4): 573–87.
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 559
Awan, I. (2016) ‘Islamophobia on social media: a qualitative analysis of the Facebook’s
walls of Hate’, International Journal of Cyber Criminology 10(1): 1–20.
Backes, U. and Mudde, C. (2000) ‘Germany: extremism without successful parties’,
Parliamentary Affairs 53(3): 457–68.
Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J. and Littler, M. (2011) The New Face of Digital Populism,
London: Demos.
Bastian, M., Heymann, S. and Jacomy, M. (2009) ‘Gephi: an open source software for
exploring and manipulating networks’, paper presented at the international AAAI
conference on weblogs and social media, San Jose, USA, May 17–20.
Bird, S., Klein, E. and Loper, E. (2009) Natural Language Processing with Python,
Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media Incorporation.
Burris, V., Smith, E., and Strahm, A. (2000) ‘White supremacist networks on the
Internet’, Sociological Focus 33(2): 215–35.
Caiani, M., Della Porta, D. and Wagemann, C. (2012) Mobilizing on the Extreme
Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Caiani, M. and Parenti, L. (2013) European and American Extreme Right Groups and
the Internet, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
Caren, N., Jowers, K. and Gaby, S. (2012) ‘A social movement online community:
Stormfront and the white nationalist movement’, in J. Earl and D. A. Rohlinger
(eds), Media, Movements, and Political Change, Bingley: Emerald Group
Publishing Limited, pp. 163–93.
Chadwick, A. (2013) The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Chadwick, A. and Stromer-Galley, J. (2016) ‘Digital media, power, and democracy in
parties and election campaigns: party decline or party renewal?’, The International
Journal of Press/Politics 21(3): 283–93.
Cleland, J., Anderson, C. and Aldridge-Deacon, J. (2017) ‘Islamophobia, war and non-
muslims as victims: an analysis of online discourse on an English defence league
message board’, Ethnic and Racial Studies: 1–17.
Della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H. and Mosca, L. (2017) Movement Parties
Against Austerity, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Edwards, G. O. (2012) ‘A comparative discourse analysis of the construction of ‘in-
groups’ in the 2005and 2010manifestos of the British national Party’, Discourse
& Society 23(3): 245–58.
Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., and Larsson, A. O. (2017) ‘Populist online communication:
introduction to the special issue’, Information, Communication & Society 20(9),
1279–92.
Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S. and Esser, F. (2017) ‘Extreme parties
and populism: an analysis of Facebook and twitter across six countries’,
Information, Communication & Society 20(9): 1–18.
Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. J. (2014) Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the
Radical Right in Britain, London: Routledge.
Golder, M. (2016) ‘Far-right parties in Europe’, Annual Review of Political Science 19:
477–97.
Golder, S. A. and Macy, M.W. (2014) ‘Digital footprints: opportunities and challenges
for online social research’, Annual Review of Sociology 40: 129–52.
560 O. KLEIN AND J. MUIS
Goodwin, M., Ramalingam, V. and Briggs, R. (2012) The New Radical Right:
Violent and Non-violent Movements in Europe, London: Institute for Strategic
Dialogue.
Greven, T. (2016) The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States. A
Comparative Perspective, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Hutter, S. (2014) Protesting Economics and Culture in Western Europe: new Cleavages
in Left and Right Politics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Immerzeel, T. (2015) ‘Voting for a change: the democratic lure of populist radical
right parties in voting behavior’, Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology, Utrecht
University.
Jäckle, S. and König, P. D. (2017) ‘The dark side of the German ‘welcome culture’:
investigating the causes behind attacks on refugees in 2015’, West European
Politics 40(2): 223–51.
Jagers, J. and Walgrave, S. (2007) ‘Populism as political communication style: an
empirical study of political parties discourse in Belgium’, European Journal of
Political Research 46(3): 319–45.
Kincaid, J. D. (2017) ‘Theorizing the radical right: directions for social movements
research on the right-wing social movements’, Sociology Compass 11(5): 1–10.
Kitschelt, H. (2007) ‘Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial
democracies: advances and challenges in comparative research’, West European
Politics 30(5): 1176–206.
Koopmans, R. (1996) ‘Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in
Western Europe: grievances or opportunities?’, European Journal of Political
Research 30(2): 185–216.
Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (2005) Contested Citizenship:
Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Maan, N., Schmid, F., Hametner, M., Šlerka, J., Ausserhofer, J. and Puschmann, C.
(2017) ‘Le Pen schenkt HC ein like: Wie sich europas rechte vernetzen’, Der
Standard, 24 May.
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1996) Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Minkenberg, M. (2003) ‘The West European radical right as a collective actor: mod-
elling the impact of cultural and structural variables on party formation and move-
ment mobilization’, Comparative European Politics 1(2): 149–70.
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mudde, C. (2016) ‘Introduction to the populist radical right’, in C. Mudde (ed.), The
Populist Radical Right: A Reader, New York NY: Routledge, pp. 1–10.
Muis, J. and Immerzeel, T. (2017) ‘Causes and consequences of the rise of populist
radical right parties and movements in Europe’, Current Sociology 65(6): 909–30.
Muis, J. (2015) ‘The rise and demise of the Dutch extreme right: discursive opportu-
nities and support for the center democrats in the 1990s’, Mobilization: An
International Quarterly 20(1), 41–60.
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 561
Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1979) Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed,
How They Fail, New York NY: Vintage.
Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986). Paper Stones, Chicago IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Rieder, B. (2013) ‘Studying Facebook via data extraction: the Netvizz application’,
Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Web Science Conference: 346–55.
Rydgren, J. (2005) ‘Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emer-
gence of a new party family’, European Journal of Political Research 44(3): 413–37.
Saal, O. (2016) ‘On patrol with the new German vigilantes’ in M. Fielitz and L. L.
Laloire (eds.), Trouble on the Far-right. Contemporary Right-wing Strategies and
Practices in Europe, Bielefeld: Transcript, pp. 73–8.
Shen, Z., Ma, K. L. and Eliassi-Rad, T. (2006) ‘Visual analysis of large heterogeneous
social networks by semantic and structural abstraction’, IEEE Transactions on
Visualization and Computer Graphics 12(6): 1427–39.
Stier, S., Posch, L., Bleier, A. and Strohmaier, M. (2017) ‘When populists become
popular: comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and
German political parties’, Information, Communication & Society 20(9): 1–24.
Zhou, Y., Reid, E., Qin, J., Chen, H. and Lai, G. (2005) ‘US domestic extremist groups
on the web: link and content analysis’, IEEE Intelligent Systems 20(5): 44–51.
Zuckerman, E. (2015) ‘Cute cats to the rescue? Participatory media and political
expression’, in D. Allen and J. Light (eds.), From Voice to Influence:
Understanding Citizenship in the Digital age, Chicago IL: University of Chicago
Press, pp. 131–54.
562 O. KLEIN AND J. MUIS
